The Houthis have seized Yemen’s Red Sea coast, the port of Mokha and Perim Island, which divides the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait into two channels. The group now controls positions from which it can monitor or threaten one of the world’s most important shipping routes.
Under normal circumstances, that alone would be enough to cause alarm. But the Strait of Hormuz, on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, is already severely disrupted. Saudi Arabia has therefore relied more heavily on its East-West pipeline to move crude from the Gulf to export terminals on the Red Sea. Then the pipeline itself came under attack.
The temporary shutdown of the Saudi pipeline perfectly illustrates the insecurity inherent in fossil fuels. When the Strait of Hormuz becomes dangerous, oil is moved across the desert. When Bab el-Mandeb becomes dangerous, tankers consider rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. Then the alternative route itself becomes a target.
Each alternative reduces one risk, but at the same time adds distance, cost and another piece of infrastructure that must be protected. The problem is no longer about one strait, one militia or one war. It is about an energy system that requires enormous quantities of combustible materials to be transported every day across unstable borders and through narrow waterways.
The emergency keeps changing its name
Energy markets tend to treat each disruption as an exceptional event. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its weaponization of pipeline gas were exceptional. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz was exceptional. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea were exceptional. So were attacks on pipelines, liquefied natural gas facilities and oil tankers. US pressure on Europe to buy more American LNG was presented as trade policy rather than an expression of energy-security vulnerability.
But after enough exceptions, a pattern should become clear. Europe spent decades increasing its dependence on cheap Russian pipeline gas. When Moscow cut supplies in 2022, prices exploded and governments rushed to fill gas storage facilities and build LNG terminals. Dependence on Russia was then partly replaced by greater dependence on the United States.
That shift improved supply diversification and was necessary during the crisis, but it did not deliver independence.
The United States subsequently incorporated energy purchases into broader trade negotiations. Under a 2025 framework, the European Union pledged to facilitate $750 billion in purchases of US energy over three years, an enormous figure that Brussels cannot directly control.
That is not equivalent to Russia shutting down a pipeline, and the United States remains a very different kind of partner. But it illustrates the same structural reality: whoever controls a fuel that Europe needs every day gains leverage over European decisions.
The scale of the dependence has changed, but the mechanism has not. In 2024, around 20 million barrels of oil a day passed through the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption. Bab el-Mandeb carried around 8.7 million barrels a day in 2023. Rerouting shipments adds weeks to voyages, consumes more fuel and increases insurance and freight costs.
Consumers experience this system as a price at the fuel pump or a heating bill. Strategically, however, it represents a permanent transfer of power to producers, transit states, armed groups and anyone capable of threatening the routes that connect them.
Strategic reserves buy time, not independence
Europe and Asia are not defenseless. Governments maintain strategic reserves, LNG cargoes can be redirected, and producers outside the Gulf can increase supplies. Alternative pipelines and ports also provide important flexibility.
That is why not every disruption immediately turns into a physical shortage.
But these buffers do not change the underlying model. Reserves are depleted when they are used, rerouted tankers must come from somewhere else, and spare production capacity belongs to another producer. If a crisis persists, competition for limited fuel returns, only at a higher price.
This year’s conflict has caused what the International Energy Agency describes as the largest oil supply disruption in the history of the market, surpassing even the 1973 crisis.
The logical response is not to abandon reserves or alternative routes, but to reduce the number of essential services that depend on them.
Electrification removes the need for daily fuel deliveries
An electric vehicle does not care whether Bab el-Mandeb is open. A heat pump does not need an LNG tanker to arrive next Tuesday. Wind turbines and solar panels continue generating power long after the ships that transported them have departed.
Renewable energy requires grids, storage, backup capacity and large quantities of minerals. It does not eliminate geopolitics.
Instead, it changes the timing and severity of the risk. Oil and gas are consumable flows. If deliveries stop, fossil-fuel assets eventually stop operating. Minerals, by contrast, are embedded in equipment. A shortage can delay the production of new batteries, grids or turbines, but it does not stop equipment that has already been installed. Many of these materials can also be recovered and recycled.
That distinction is fundamental. As the International Energy Agency has noted, an oil shock affects every driver who uses fuel, while a mineral shortage primarily affects the supply of new equipment.
Europe should therefore double down on renewable power generation, electric transport, heat pumps, batteries, electricity grids and demand flexibility. The European Commission has estimated that accelerating clean-energy deployment could reduce the EU’s fossil-fuel import bill by €130 billion a year by 2030.
This is not merely climate spending. It is the purchase of strategic freedom.
Europe must not replace one monopoly with another
The obvious objection is that Europe risks moving from importing oil and gas to importing solar panels, batteries, magnets and processed minerals from China.
That risk is real. China is expected to supply more than 60% of refined lithium and cobalt in 2035, and around 80% of battery-grade graphite and rare earth elements. Europe cannot describe its energy system as independent if it lacks a meaningful ability to manufacture or repair it.
But the answer is not continued dependence on fossil fuels. It is to build the material side of the transition as quickly as power generation itself is being developed.
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act targets domestic extraction of 10%, processing of 40% and recycling of 25% by 2030. Europe should accelerate responsible mining and deepen partnerships with Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Canada and Australia. More importantly, it needs to invest in refining, cathodes, magnets, battery cells and recycling.
This supply chain will have environmental and geopolitical risks of its own. It must therefore be diversified, regulated and made circular. Yet the materials entering that supply chain build assets that generate or store energy for years. They are not burned once and then replaced by the next shipment.
The last fossil-fuel crisis will not announce itself
The Houthi advance is dangerous. Governments need to protect shipping, stabilize markets and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen.
But treating this crisis as simply another shipping emergency would repeat the same fundamental mistake that has accompanied every previous oil shock.
There will always be another unstable producer, another supplier willing to use energy as leverage, another damaged pipeline, another sanctioned exporter or another contested strategic passage. The geography changes, but the dependence remains.
Europe and Asia cannot control every strait, political system or war. But they can control how much their prosperity depends on fuel that must pass through them.
The next oil shock is already here. The real objective should be to ensure that fewer consumers notice the one that comes after it.
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